TL;DR
- Asked whether onchain finance is more transparent and safer, transparent but not safer, or less safe than traditional finance, a large majority of the room chose transparent but not safer. Elias Kokaly sided with the majority, and nobody changed their vote by the end.
- The discussion started from two recent hacks: $6.3 billion stolen from Binance through an exploited employee device, and about $100 million taken from a French regional bank through a compromised third-party provider.
- For Elias Kokaly, both cases come down to governance: the policies, controls and roles an institution has in place, whether it handles crypto or not.
- Onchain hacks cannot be hidden, and the response can be fast: during the Binance hack, Tether and Circle froze billions of dollars within an hour, helped by alerts shared through TRM's Beacon Network.
- Participants split on disclosure: an exchange must speak at once to avoid a run, a regulated bank works through its supervisor first, and some argued that early warnings protect others using the same vendor.
- Accountability remains open, from the hacker and the custodian to stablecoin issuers and DeFi protocols where stolen funds were used as collateral.
Speakers
Is Onchain Really More Transparent Than Traditional Finance, or Just Faster Than the Regulators Watching It?
- Elias Kokaly, Head of Strategic Accounts at TRM Labs
The workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule: statements by participants are reported without names or affiliations.
Two hacks, two ecosystems
Elias Kokaly, who describes TRM Labs as an AI investigations firm focused on onchain compliance, opened with two recent cases. Binance lost $6.3 billion in a cyberattack that started with an exploited employee device. A French regional bank lost about $100 million after a third-party service provider was compromised first. The two ecosystems work differently, yet both attacks went through a weak link outside the core system.
The moderator added detail on the bank case: according to the moderator, the funds did not go straight to crypto exchanges. They moved from the regional bank to three or four licensed neobanks in the EU over a weekend, and only then to exchanges, which raises questions about how such amounts could move so quickly without raising flags. According to the moderator, crypto investigators were the first to raise the alert.
Transparent, not necessarily safer
The room voted on three options: onchain finance is more transparent and safer, transparent but not safer, or traditional finance is safer. A large majority chose the middle answer, and the arguments on both sides were sharp:
- Some participants called the Binance hack a basic security failure, with signing power over large transfers resting on a single point of failure
- Others argued that most core banking systems date back decades and will not withstand AI-powered attacks, and that state-backed groups such as North Korea's Lazarus run attacks no single firm can resist
- One participant noted that blockchain hacks cannot be hidden, while large institutions hacked by the same actors often never make the news
- Another pointed to speed: blockchains optimise for it, and $6 billion would never leave a traditional payment system in twenty minutes
Elias Kokaly sided with the majority. Transparency does not make a system safer: the blockchain is an immutable ledger, and TRM's job is to tell users who is behind an address and what risk it carries. For Elias Kokaly, crypto and traditional finance carry different types of risk, and as a former investigator, Elias Kokaly would rather trace a crypto transaction than follow money mules carrying cash.
Governance is the common problem
For Elias Kokaly, both hacks are governance failures: which processes and policies were in place, and who knew what to do. With traditional institutions launching digital asset products, Elias Kokaly does not see the two worlds as separate. At a recent meeting with financial institutions in Turkey, the conclusion was that digital assets should not sit in a separate box inside a bank, and should be covered by the same governance as everything else.
Elias Kokaly also warned that attacks are becoming more sophisticated with AI, that analytics firms are targets themselves, with a competitor hit by a cyberattack the previous week, and that social engineering starts with what employees post online.
How the response worked onchain
When the Binance hack happened, a war room was set up within the industry and each player knew its role. Stablecoin issuers Tether and Circle froze billions of dollars within an hour. Elias Kokaly described TRM's Beacon Network, where law enforcement agencies and private companies share addresses linked to illicit funds:
- Law enforcement in Australia and the US submitted addresses linked to the stolen funds
- TRM then alerted exchanges that could receive those funds, so they could stop the transactions
A participant said about $2.6 billion in USDT and USDC had been frozen, which can be checked onchain. DeFi remains harder to police: according to Elias Kokaly, protocols block sanctioned users at the front end, while hackers interact directly with smart contracts and move faster.
Disclosure and accountability
The two incidents were communicated very differently. Binance went public at once, while the bank's public disclosure came days later, because under DORA a regulated bank must first report to its supervisor and find the root cause. Participants noted that in both cases the first message was that client funds were safe, while the attack was still under way. Views differed on what should come first:
- An exchange that stays silent risks a run, since clients may fear their funds are gone
- A bank backed by capital and a supervisor can organise a resolution before speaking
- Others argued that early disclosure warns every institution using the same vendor
On accountability, one participant put it on the hacker and on states, and asked why prevention gets less attention than consequences. Others put it on the custodian, arguing that whoever takes custody of an asset is responsible for it, and that each hack reveals a breakdown in a security, disclosure or third-party policy. A participant also raised the liability of stablecoin issuers and of DeFi protocols where the hacker borrowed against stolen assets, and the moderator noted that rules on DeFi liquidity pools are being discussed in the EU and Switzerland.
Elias Kokaly closed on trust: if an exchange were hacked, Elias Kokaly would probably withdraw funds, while still trusting a bank because of the institutional trust it carries. A participant recalled that banks can fail too.
Conclusion
Most of the room voted that onchain finance is more transparent without being safer, and the vote had not moved by the end. A hack on a public blockchain can be traced and its funds frozen within an hour, while a bank hack can stay inside regulatory reporting for days. In both cases the attackers came in through a weak link outside the core system: an employee device at Binance, a third-party provider at the bank. For Elias Kokaly, that makes governance the common problem, and banks launching digital asset products will need clear roles for when something goes wrong.



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