The U.S. is advancing two major pieces of legislation — the CLARITY Act and the GENIUS Act. What should we take away from them?
Two big themes stand out from the CLARITY Act. First, yield: everything points to some form of remuneration being authorized in the U.S., though not as a direct payout. A transaction would need to be involved before any reward could be distributed. Second, there's a push to shield DeFi protocol developers — people like those behind Tornado Cash — from bearing excessive legal liability. None of this is set in stone yet. Democrats are also pushing an ethics provision targeting Donald Trump, which could still derail the whole thing.
>> The CLARITY Act: How the U.S. Is Rewriting the Stablecoin Playbook
Do you see that as a positive development?
We'll see how it lands. The big-picture upside is that CLARITY plus GENIUS amounts to something like MiCA, but for the United States. And what MiCA has achieved in Europe is that two or three years after its adoption, virtually every European bank is looking at digital assets in one way or another. Once GENIUS and CLARITY are passed, they could open the door to real institutional use of digital assets in the U.S.
The European Commission has opened a consultation on MiCA. What needs to improve for stablecoins?
We're still working through this internally — we have our own view at Qivalis, but we're also talking to the banks to get theirs, and we need to factor in our shareholders. The core issue is international competitiveness. If stablecoins end up being yield-bearing in the U.S., in whatever form, Europe will have to think hard about what it does on its side. Otherwise it risks falling behind again: ahead on regulation, but ultimately outpaced — either because it didn't dare enough, or because it regulated too much.
The other point is the reserve requirements, particularly for significant issuers. The obligation to hold 60% in bank deposits is a major financial drag. To me, that's one of the items that needs fixing.
Are reserves a bigger issue than yield?
Both matter. It all depends on how things shake out in the U.S., because it could still evolve. But if they follow through — and that's where it seems headed — then Europe will have to be pragmatic. The last piece is equivalence and multi-issuance. On multi-issuance, I'm hopeful we'll land on some form of equivalence: if CLARITY passes, there's a case to be made for it. It all comes back to the same thing — not losing our international competitiveness by being too restrictive in Europe. That's what European lawmakers need to keep in mind, because blockchain is global by nature. Everything you build is available everywhere, by definition. In an ideal world, we'd have a global stablecoin regulatory framework. Until then, let's be realistic about what's happening in other jurisdictions.
"If Europe keeps playing it too safe, it risks falling behind — again"
Everyone knows you intend to launch your stablecoin in Europe. Could you set up a structure in the U.S. to distribute it there?
If we wanted to, we'd probably have to go that route, given how it's structured. But the U.S. clearly isn't our first target. Look at where stablecoins are actually used and where the euro circulates in fiat — particularly for cross-border payments: the real corridors run toward Latin America, Africa, and Asia, for things like maritime shipping. Those regions feel far more immediate. On the other end of the world, Japan just announced that starting June 1, foreign stablecoins will be permitted for use there. That's huge — almost as significant as CLARITY, because it's already been voted into law. We're actually in discussions with a consortium of banks building a Japanese stablecoin, as well as with the Arena One consortium, because there's a lot of synergy. That cross-border flow is our most important target.
Are you still aiming for a second-half launch?
Yes, but it depends on the regulator. We're in a licensing process, and it'll take as long as it takes. I can't put any pressure on the regulator. All we can do is stay in the process, answer questions as they come, and demonstrate that we are dead serious about compliance.
Why is it taking so long, given that you represent so many major European banks?
At the end of the day, you need to obtain an EMI license — an electronic money institution license. Even with the banks behind us, we have to prove two things: first, that we are independent from them; and second, that we, as a small entity, are building the processes, the tools, and the teams to properly manage our risk and compliance. We're building a financial institution. We started in October, so it will have taken us a little over a year to be operational. Building a financial institution in a year is actually pretty fast. An EMI license in Europe typically takes six to nine months, and here we're dealing with somewhat newer technology. So we're roughly on track.
"Building a financial institution in one year is actually pretty fast"
What are the conditions for a bank to join the consortium, and how much does it cost?
I can't say anything about cost — not least because the valuation changes with every funding round. When the first banks came in, we had nothing. Just an idea. It was essentially a pre-seed round. Today, we're already in the licensing process, we have a team of nearly 30 people, and we've built a large part of the required infrastructure. We can say with some confidence that everything will be ready this summer and that the license should come through in the second half, based on our exchanges with the DNB — the Dutch regulator. With each new round, it's like going from pre-seed to seed, then to Series A. Except it's not a pure venture play: we're also building infrastructure, which makes it a bit more complex.
What specific criteria do you look for in a bank?
It's an open consortium. We've mainly been talking to European banks, because the project has a strong European DNA, and we want to preserve that. But we're open to non-European banks. I can't give you precise rules on who gets in and who doesn't. For a non-European bank, it would make more sense if there were a clear strategic rationale — strong positioning in cross-border payments or in digital assets. For now, it's an open consortium targeting European banks, but that could evolve if we identify a strategic need to broaden our shareholder base.
You've onboarded 37 banks. Is there a cap, or can it grow indefinitely?
An unlimited number would create an enormous resource problem. But in principle, yes — it's an open consortium, and we remain open to further expansion rounds. If you think of major network infrastructures, like Swift or even Visa in their early days, they all started with a handful of entities before scaling rapidly.
How do you communicate effectively across that many stakeholders without creating confusion?
The governance is very clear on our independence from shareholders. But it's equally crucial to maintain the connection with them, because as they roll out their digital asset strategies, we want to be at the center of it — to be the stablecoin they use. Part of the team is dedicated to shareholder communications. We also have to be very mindful of competition rules, since these are rival banks sitting around the same table. On one hand, we hold large group meetings where we update everyone on progress. On the other, we have one-on-one conversations when it's relevant — either to make sure a bank will actually use our stablecoin, or conversely, to help those that are a bit behind to catch up. Because the more they use it, the faster we all move.
Have you ever turned down a bank that applied?
I can't get into specifics — we're bound by heavy confidentiality agreements. But during one of the rounds, if I recall correctly, a few banks decided not to join us, for their own reasons. As for actual rejections, that process is mainly handled by our relations team.
Could a bank be too small to interest you?
It depends on its digital asset strategy and its maturity. Even a small bank can do a lot of interesting things. And it's not about an S&P rating or being publicly listed. Not all of our banks are listed, for that matter.
How will you select the banks that manage the reserves?
We have our own framework for that. Technological readiness is part of it — we can't work on the treasury side with a bank that still runs its batch processing on mainframes. It just doesn't work technically. We're still finalizing the specifics, but we've already selected a few, which I can't name yet. They'll be large European banks. As we scale, we'll need to expand that number: as a significant issuer, we may need up to ten treasury banks, if only for risk diversification.
Is a banking license on your roadmap?
I don't think so — not right now — because we don't want to compete with our own shareholders. We see ourselves first and foremost as an infrastructure builder: creating the interface between the euro and the blockchain, and injecting enough liquidity to make it work. Over time, that vision could lead us to work with other counterparties, or to explore agentic AI. But those are conversations for later. Right now, we're keeping a narrow scope: get the license, launch the product, build momentum.
"We don't want to compete with our own shareholders"
Some major banks — notably BNP Paribas, which is part of your consortium — are very bullish on tokenized deposits. What's your take?
Tokenized deposits are, like the digital euro, one building block in a complementary monetary stack that Europe is constructing. But there are significant differences with stablecoins. The main one: a stablecoin is a bearer instrument. Whoever holds it can use it. A tokenized deposit presupposes a connection to a bank — you can't use it in just any DeFi protocol. Tokenized deposits will be useful for certain corporate or interbank transactions not covered by wholesale CBDC. But I don't see a tokenized deposit settling a Bitcoin trade, a perpetuals trade, or even a transfer to India.
Picture this: you sign a major trade agreement with India, and 30 or 40% of the flows now need to be in euros rather than dollars. To pay an Indian supplier, you'll use a stablecoin, not a tokenized deposit. These are different use cases, and they're complementary. Another point: stablecoins are ready now. Tokenized deposits still require a lot of work on interoperability, because the deposit needs to move from bank to bank, and the recipient may not even be onboarded. That's far more complicated — it's not a short-term solution.
Two weeks ago, Dante Disparte — Circle's chief strategy officer — told us: "Are you sure you want a Credit Suisse deposit token?" He has a point. But what about JP Morgan, Société Générale, or BNP?
The other upside of a deposit token is that if it's backed by retail deposits, you theoretically retain the €100,000 guarantee. But you could flip the question: do you want a stablecoin backed by short-term French government bonds? It's tongue-in-cheek, but it points to a real European problem — we don't have a unified capital market for sovereign debt. Building a portfolio of high-quality liquid assets is therefore slightly more complicated than in the U.S., where you just have Treasuries.
Is that fragmentation in the debt markets a limiting factor for the euro stablecoin versus the dollar?
No, I don't think so, because the markets are enormous. Compare the volumes: euro stablecoins currently weigh about €0.6 billion. Deposits held in European banks are on the order of €19 trillion. The M2 money supply in Europe sits around €16 trillion. Euro stablecoins represent less than a rounding error — roughly 0.04%. That's not going to threaten financial stability anytime soon. It's a very European thing to worry about 0.03 or 0.04% of the system. Even if we become significant at €5 billion, it would still be a rounding error next to €19 trillion. There's plenty of room for innovation.
"It's very European to worry about 0.04% of the financial system"
Have you started working with intermediaries in Africa, Latin America, or Asia to distribute your stablecoin?
Yes, we're talking to a lot of people in Asia. I was in Hong Kong in March for Consensus, and I was really struck by the level of interest in the euro on-chain. People in that part of the world are already using stablecoins. A major market maker working with us told me, for instance, that buyers in Kyrgyzstan pay for Ethiopian coffee in stablecoins because it just makes sense. And they'd rather use a euro stablecoin than a dollar one, because the dollar has been losing value for twelve years, on top of the geopolitical risk.
Europe, meanwhile, is perceived globally as an anchor of stability, and the euro as a stable currency. If we put the euro on-chain with real liquidity behind it, the interest will be massive. That's why the Japanese announcement is so significant. And we have six or seven of the most important Spanish banks in the consortium — there are huge remittance flows between Spain, Latin America, and Africa, exactly where stablecoins make the most sense.
What are your priority use cases? Crypto trading, DeFi, then cross-border payments?
Exactly. We're looking at where the market is today: where stablecoins are already in use, and where people would prefer a euro over a dollar. Take a European crypto-native: a year ago, he bought USDC and parked it in a vault earning 8%. Twelve months later, the dollar is down 12% — his 8% has turned into −4%. Now imagine he could earn a yield in his own currency, even just 4%: he comes out ahead. It's better than a bank account, and above all, he avoids layering currency risk on top of DeFi products that are already complex enough. So we're looking at DeFi, crypto trading. Some banks also run trading platforms, but even when they offer fiat-euro-to-Bitcoin pairs, under the hood they're routing through USDC or USDT. If we create a liquid euro market for BTC, that'll be tremendously useful for all these European platforms.
%201.png)
%201.png)
%201.png)
%201.png)
%201.png)
